WASHINGTON - In remarks on the Senate floor today, U.S. Senator Tom Udall (D-NM) expressed mounting concern about the U.S.'s strategy in Afghanistan, calling on President Obama to stick to his timeline for an "accelerated transition" to the Afghans and emphasizing that our military commitment there should not be open-ended.
Udall's remarks came one day before President Obama is expected to unveil an annual review of strategy in Afghanistan and Pakistan, which he ordered last December when he authorized an increase of 30,000 troops to Afghanistan.
Last April, Udall participated in a bipartisan, congressional delegation trip to Afghanistan, where he met with New Mexican troops, military leaders and Afghan dignitaries. During that trip, Udall saw firsthand the progress - and the many challenges - we face in our efforts there.
"I am proud of the work our brave men and women in uniform are doing there. I am equally proud of our diplomatic workers, aid workers, and civilians who are working hard to improve the livelihood of the Afghan people. ...These are some of the finest men and women our nation has to offer to the Afghan people," Udall said in his remarks. "But it is not their job that is in question. It is ours. The Congress, the president, his administration, the military leadership. It is up to us to find the answers, to ensure we have a clear, achievable mission in place for our soldiers to carry out. Today, I am not sure that is the case."
Udall's remarks as prepared for delivery:
I rise today to discuss the war in Afghanistan.
We are approaching another signpost in a conflict that has kept our military men and women in harm's way longer than any other in our history. One-hundred-and-nine months and counting. That's longer than the wars in Vietnam or Iraq. It's longer even than the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan in the 1980s.
The signpost I want to speak of today is one President Obama posted when he ordered the troop increase in Afghanistan last December.
In his orders, he also called for a review of our war strategy to be conducted one year later. The review was to include, and I quote, "the security situation and other conditions, including improvement in Afghan governance, development of Afghan National Security Forces, Pakistani actions and international support."
That review is due this month.
I commend our President for his foresight in calling for this review. But in recent months, I've read troubling statements from administration and military leaders. These statements lead me to believe that this review is seen as nothing more than a check in the box.
In a Washington Post article, an Undersecretary of Defense said as much when he stated that the review won't go into much more detail than what is already provided to the President during his monthly status updates. General Petraeus was also quoted in the same article as saying, "I would not want to overplay the significance of this review."
I think this approach to this review would be another tragic mistake in what I fear is an ongoing series of them.
After nine years and $455 billion dollars, the unfortunate reality is that we're still not anywhere near where we want to be - or should be - in Afghanistan. And anything less than a thorough and unflinching review is unacceptable. It's unacceptable to me, and unacceptable to the American people.
The famed military author Carl von Clausewitz wrote a book titled On War, which is required reading for any military professional. In that book, he wrote, quote: "The first, the supreme, the most far-reaching act of judgment that the statesman and commander have to make is to establish...the kind of war on which they are embarking; neither mistaking it for, nor trying to turn it into, something that is alien to its nature. This is the first of all strategic questions and the most comprehensive."
Today, our struggles in Afghanistan necessitate that we again follow von Clausewitz's advice. We must answer the big questions about the kind of war we set out to fight, the kind of war we ARE fighting.
Everyone knows the big question when it comes to Afghanistan. That's why it's the big question. "Is our prolonged involvement in Afghanistan worth the costs we as a nation are paying for it?"
Is it worth the human cost? Thousands of Americans have been maimed and killed in this war so far ... and thousands more stand in harm's way as we speak.
Is it worth the fiscal cost? Our wars in the last decade have left us with huge deficits. And for the last decade, wars in both Afghanistan and Iraq went unpaid for. Instead of rallying the nation during a time of war - asking for sacrifices from everyone - Congress and two presidents chose to pass this massive debt on to future generations -the first time we have done so in modern times.
But the real issue is not that we are spending to protect our nation. The issue is whether that spending is making us safer.
Which leads to the question: is our continued involvement in Afghanistan worth the cost to our larger national security priorities? Our commitment in Afghanistan is pulling time, energy and funds from other equally important national security priorities. Priorities like energy independence, like counterproliferation, and countering terrorist activities in places like Yemen and Somalia.
That's why this review is so critical. We have to decide - as a nation - if our prolonged involvement in Afghanistan is worth it. And we must decide on an exit strategy.
We have a responsibility to answer that big question with a thoroughness and an honesty that honors the sacrifices of our military men and women. I believe we answer that question by using this signpost ... by using this review ... to address four key issues that will ultimately mean the difference between our success and our failure in Afghanistan.
To me, those four issues are: Our timeline for an exit strategy. An accelerated transition to an Afghan-led security operation. Corruption in the Karzai government. And safe havens in Pakistan.
Let me take them one at a time.
First: our timeline for an exit strategy. This review should provide an honest assessment of where we are in the timeline that President Obama laid out last year.
In his speech at West Point last December, President Obama rightly dropped the open-ended guarantee of U.S. and NATO involvement. Here's what he said, quote, "the absence of a time frame for transition would deny us any sense of urgency in working with the Afghan government. It must be clear that Afghans will have to take responsibility for their security, and that America has no interest in fighting an endless war in Afghanistan."
His order last year for the military mission was clear and included a timeline based on an "accelerated transition". In that order, he focused on, quote, "Increasing the size of the ANSF and leveraging the potential for local security forces so we can transition responsibility for security to the Afghan government on a timeline that will permit us to begin to decrease our troop presence by July 2011."
July 2011. That's little more than six months from now.
Mr. President: the American people deserve to know: Is July 2011 still a realistic time frame to begin our exit from Afghanistan? If not, what has happened to cause a delay? And how long will that delay be? What will be the additional costs - both human and budgetary?
The bottom line is this: without an aggressive timeline for reducing U.S. military support in the region - a timeline that the Afghans believe is rock solid - there is no incentive for them to defend their villages and cities. With the U.S. and NATO as the guarantors of security, the people of Afghanistan could rely on our forces to provide security indefinitely.
Chairman Levin has also given careful thought to the issue of a timeline. In a recent speech to the Council on Foreign Relations he said that, quote, "open-ended commitments encourage drift and permit inaction; firm timelines demand attention and force action."
Without an aggressive timeline, there is no exit strategy.
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Issue No. 2 - and directly related to issue No. 1 - the accelerated transition to the Afghan people. This must be an Afghan-led security effort.
This month's report should update the American people on our progress - or lack thereof - in turning over security duties to the Afghan National Army, Afghan National Security Forces, and Afghan National Police.
The famed British officer T.E. Lawrence - known to many as Lawrence of Arabia - once said with regard to the Arab insurgency against the Ottoman Empire, quote, "Do not try to do too much with your own hands. Better the Arabs do it tolerably than they do it perfectly. It is their war, and you are to help them."
This quote is also mentioned in the Army's Field Manual on counterinsurgency. In Afghanistan, I believe the same approach can be applied.
The Afghan security forces are not doing their job perfectly, nor should we expect the Afghan forces to match the might of the U.S. military. But to echo T.E. Lawrence, they are beginning to do it tolerably, and I believe it is better that the Afghans continue to build on their new success.
Combined, an aggressive timeline and an accelerated transition to the Afghans will help us achieve two equally important goals.
First, the timely handover of security helps prove to the international community that the American people do not have imperial ambitions in Afghanistan. As President Obama said at West Point, quote, "We have no interest in occupying your country."
And second, a timely handover allows the United States and its allies to bring our heroes home. It allows us to begin the important work of reducing our deficits, investing in our nation and our people, so that we can remain strong and build a more prosperous nation.
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Which brings me to issue No. 3: Corruption in the Karzai government.
There is no doubt our armed forces have the ability to conduct the difficult counterinsurgency work of clearing and holding. The question is whether the Afghan government has the ability to build their nation and to be ready for a timely transition.
That is why, in his order to the military, President Obama was clear: "Given the profound problems of legitimacy and effectiveness with the Karzai government, we must focus on what is realistic. Our plan for the way forward in dealing with the Karzai government has four elements ... Working with Karzai when we can, working around him when we must; enhancing sub-national governance; strengthening corruption reduction efforts; and implementing a post election compact."
There's no doubt that corruption is rampant throughout Afghanistan and, in particular, within the Karzai administration. For years, independent, daily press reports from Afghanistan, as well as official U.S. government reports, confirm corruption at all levels of Afghan society. A recent leak of diplomatic cables reveals the severity of the problem.
First, let me stress that I do not condone these leaks. They have needlessly put our military and diplomatic corps at risk. But these documents really pulled back the curtain on the scale of corruption in Afghanistan.
One example in particular illustrated the tremendous difficulty we face in our search for an honest, reliable partner. That was the account in The New York Times of former Afghanistan Vice President Ahmed Zia Massoud. Massoud was detained after he brought $52 million in unexplained cash into the United Arab Emirates. He was allowed to keep the $52 million dollars.
Let's me say that again: $52 million dollars. That's a lot of money - especially when you consider that his government salary was a few hundred dollars a month.
Not only is corruption rampant in Afghanistan - with reports of Karzai's own brother involved in double dealing and unscrupulous actions - but basic government functions are suffering because of Karzai's inability to manage his own government.
In Kandahar, our military has made this former Taliban stronghold a much more secure city. But despite that progress, The Washington Post has reported multiple vacancies in key government positions. As an unnamed U.S. official stated, quote: "We are acting as donor and government. That's not sustainable."
We cannot be expected to indefinitely shoulder the security or governmental burdens in Afghanistan. Having a firm timeline will put President Karzai on notice that he must step up his efforts to make this an Afghan-led effort.
Our goal must be to transition responsibility and authority for the future of Afghanistan to the Afghan people ... and this month's review should include a report to the American people on our progress in making that happen.
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Which brings me to the fourth and final issue: safe havens in Pakistan.
For years, safe havens have been permitted to exist in Pakistan for insurgent and terrorist forces, enabling them to operate freely.
This has been one of the worst kept secrets in the region, which is why President Obama stated during his West Point speech that, quote, "we will act with the full recognition that our success in Afghanistan is inextricably linked to our partnership with Pakistan. We're in Afghanistan to prevent a cancer from once again spreading through that country. But this same cancer has also taken root in the border region of Pakistan. That's why we need a strategy that works on both sides of the border."
Since 2001, the United States has sent more than $10.4 billion dollars to Pakistan to support humanitarian and security operations. Despite these expenditures, radical militant groups such as the Quetta Shura Taliban and the Haqqani Network have continued to leverage their freedom of movement to kill, maim, and disrupt our efforts and those of our NATO allies.
These insurgent activities are nearly textbook, something that the Army Field Manual on counterinsurgency describes in detail as having occurred throughout the history of insurgent warfare. Quote: "The issue of sanctuaries thus cannot be ignored during planning. ... Effective COIN operations work to eliminate all sanctuaries."
With such military advice in mind, I must ask this - how do we expect to defeat an insurgency that is being supported by elements of the Pakistani military and intelligence service on the other side of the Khyber Pass?
After nine years, why are we tolerating these safe havens? Mullah Omar, the leader of the Taliban insurgents, is in exile in Pakistan. His followers regroup and rest in Pakistan - only to cross the border and fight our troops once again.
Insurgent fighters have increased their attacks by 53 percent over the last quarter. And when both ISAF and U.S. forces are unable to infiltrate their base of operation, how can we expect to maintain an adequate level of security for the future?
President Obama's order specifically spelled out assessment criteria for Pakistan. The assessment was intended to include the following question, quote: "Are there indicators that we have begun to shift Pakistan's strategic calculus and eventually end their active and passive support for extremists?"
Thus far, Pakistan's "strategic calculus" has been overly focused on India and towards turning a blind eye to radical groups in Waziristan and other regions near the Afghan border.
Furthermore, the current position of the Pakistani government has only led to a host of crazed conspiracy theories about the United States and its involvement in the region, giving fuel to the recruitment efforts of our enemies.
Because of double-dealing by some in Pakistan, and a Pakistani government that has not fully supported our efforts, we are sending our men and women to fight in Afghanistan without a true partner. We're asking them to fight with one hand tied behind their back.
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These challenges I just discussed, they are not a secret. Each and every one of them has been debated, discussed, dissected. And yet, the answers remain elusive.
We invaded Afghanistan as a justifiable military response to the tragic attacks of September 11th, 2001. This response was overwhelmingly supported by the Congress, including myself, the public, and the international community.
But I believe today, after 109 months of fighting, after more than 1,400 American military deaths in Operation Enduring Freedom, almost 10,000 American military men and women injured, after $455 billion dollars and counting expended, a good, hard, realistic reassessment of our mission is needed.
If our plan to succeed in Afghanistan is not yielding the results we seek, then we must also reevaluate our plan and mission.
Make no mistake, I am proud of the work our brave men and women in uniform are doing there. I am equally proud of our diplomatic workers, aid workers, and civilians who are working hard to improve the livelihood of the Afghan people. I had an opportunity to meet many of them earlier this year on a CODEL led by my colleague Senator Carper of Delaware. These are some of the finest men and women our nation has to offer to the Afghan people.
But it is not their job that is in question. It is ours. The Congress, the president, his administration, the military leadership. It is up to us to find the answers, to ensure we have a clear, achievable mission in place for our soldiers to carry out.
Today, I am not sure that is the case. I am looking forward to hearing the conclusions of the review the President called for one year ago. I look forward to hearing the President reaffirm his July 2011 deadline for our "accelerated transition" to the Afghans.
We all must be prepared to ask the hard questions and demand honest answers - regardless of the political consequences. Our military men and women deserve no less.
